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Ab stract
This paper argues against the view that the Freudian unconscious can be
understood as an extension of ordinary belief-desire psychology. The paper
argues that Freud's pic ture of the mind challenges the paradigm of folk
psychology, as it is understood by much contemporary philosophy of
psychology and cognitive science. The dynamic unconscious postulated by
psychoanalysis operates according to rules and prin ci ples that are distinct in
kind from those rules that organise rational and conscious thought.
Psychoanalysis offers us a radical reconception of our ordinary way of
thinking about our own minds.
In a re cent pa per in this jour nal, Andries Gouws sketches a “re con struc tion of the
Freud ian un con scious, and an ar gu ment for its ex is tence.” He pro vides a defense of
the Freud ian no tion of the un con scious in the hopes of bol ster ing the claims of psy -
cho anal y sis against Car te sian-type scep ti cism of its ex is tence. He writes: “The strat egy 
fol lowed at tempts to side-step the ex tended de bates about the va lid ity of Freud's meth -
ods and con clu sions, by bas ing it self on the de sire/be lief schema for un der stand ing
and ex plain ing hu man be hav iour – a schema nei ther folk psy chol ogy nor sci en tific
psy chol ogy can do with out” (Gouws 2003: 361) Gouws out lines two dif fer ent kinds of 
men tal pro cess ing: one gov erned by ra tio nal thought, and the other by wish ful think -
ing. His ar gu ment is that wish ful think ing re quires an un con scious be cause “it is in im i -
cal to a clear, com plete and un am big u ous ac knowl edge ment of its own sta tus.” What
dis tin guishes wish ful think ing from ra tio nal thought, in his view, is that the wish ful
thinker dis torts re al ity in the light of her de sires. Wishes, un like ra tio nal thoughts like
be liefs, do not mod ify them selves in re sponse to the ob sta cles re al ity might pres ent;
rather, re al ity is ei ther ig nored or dis torted in the ser vice of the wish. He points out
(rightly) that wish ful think ing must dis guise its true na ture in or der to be ef fec tive; he
then con cludes that this is ev i dence for the ex is tence of the Freud ian un con scious.
“My ul ti mate aim,” he writes, “is to show how wish ful think ing gone ram pant can lead 
to some thing like an un con scious.” For Gouws, wish ful think ing and ra tio nal thought
“form two ends of a con tin uum, not a di chot omy”; he states that “Our view dis penses
with any line pre tend ing to di vide the un con scious from the pre con scious (Freud
floun ders ev ery time he pres ents them as a di chot omy, rather than a con tin uum)”
(Gouws 2003: 362). Thus wish ful think ing must be a spe cies of be lief-de sire psy chol -
ogy, the schema of folk psy chol ogy. Wish ful think ing (and other ir ra tio nal phe nom ena 
such as self de cep tion) can be ex plained, on this model, by the var i ous fail ures to
accommodate the demands of re al ity that frustrate or otherwise hamper the fulfilment
of desires. Wishful thinking ignores the constraints within which “realistic thinking”
operates. 
I do not wish to dis cuss the de tails of Gouws's pro ject, even though I am un cer tain
whether he has pro vided the de fence he hoped for of the Freud ian un con scious. It
seems to me that it might be pos si ble to deal with var i ous cases of wish ful fil ment and
self de cep tion by routes other than that of pos it ing an un con scious.1 What wor ries me
is the deeper is sue con cern ing the na ture of the men tal – namely the claim that wish ful 
think ing and ra tio nal be lief lie on ei ther end of a sin gle con tin uum. If one ac cepts this
claim, then the very na ture of the Freud ian un con scious2 is at stake; if wishes are very
much like de sires, then the gram mar (if you will) of the un con scious will be sim i lar to
the gram mar of ra tio nal be liefs and de sires. Or, to put it an other way, pri mary men tal
pro cess ing (which gov erns the un con scious) will not be rad i cally dif fer ent from sec -
ond ary men tal pro cess ing (which gov erns the con scious / pre con scious).3 Gouws is
not alone in his por trayal of the un con scious – the de bate con cern ing the na ture of
psy cho an a lytic en ti ties has a long his tory; the claim is of ten made that Freud sim ply
ex tended our or di nary folk psy cho log i cal con cepts and ex pla na tions of hu man be hav -
iour. Part of the temp ta tion to see psy cho anal y sis as an ex ten sion of or di nary psy cho -
log i cal think ing lies in the de sire to see what Freud and his fol low ers were do ing as
giv ing us a deeper un der stand ing of what we’d al ready – on some level or an other –
known all along. What we gain from psy cho anal y sis in re turn for learn ing that we are
less ra tio nal than we had thought is the prom ise that the ir ra tio nal, ul ti mately, is ex pli -
ca ble in terms of – or re duc ible to – the ra tio nal. The dif fer ence be tween the ra tio nal
and the ir ra tio nal is that ir ra tio nal thoughts and be hav iours are caused by be liefs and
de sires that are un con scious, and once these are made con scious, the thought or ac tion
can be seen to be per fectly rea son able by the lights of the per son who has them. Those 
who ar gue for the sim i lar ity be tween or di nary and psy cho an a lytic ex pla na tions of the
mind hope to show that the only dif fer ence be tween an or di nary be lief and an un con -
scious one lies pre cisely (and sim ply) in the fact that the lat ter is un con scious. It is this 
ap peal to un con scious be liefs and de sires that pro vides the bridge be tween psy cho an a -
lytic and or di nary folk psy cho log i cal ex pla na tions: by wid en ing the scope of in ten -
tional ex pla na tion, psy cho anal y sis shows us that the ir ra tio nal is dif fer ent in de gree,
but not dif fer ent in kind, from gar den va ri ety be lief-de sire psy chol ogy. And yet, as
Wittgenstein pointed out, the term “un con scious”, when used as an ad jec tive, changes
the noun it mod i fies. Just as a straw man is not a kind of man at all, so an un con scious
de sire is not re ally like an or di nary de sire, nor an un con scious be lief like a or di nary
be lief. The Freud ian un con scious splits the mind in more rad i cal ways than Gouws's
pa per – and the tra di tion he is de fend ing – al lows. This char ac teri sa tion of the un con -
scious and of the dif fer ences that ex ist in men tal func tion ing is, to my mind, one of the 
ma jor con tri bu tions of psy cho anal y sis to the way we think about our selves, and
Freud's claims flour ish, rather than floun der, in its wake.
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1 See, for in stance, the writ ings of Al fred Mele, Don ald Davidson and Rob ert Audi on self de cep tion.
2 From here on, I’ll use the term “un con scious” to re fer to the Freud ian no tion of the dy namic un con -
scious, un less oth er wise stated.
3 I am aware that the lan guage used here is de rived from Freud's top o graph i cal schema, which is a crude
men tal model that Freud him self re fined. I use the terms to re fer to broad types of men tal func tion ing,
leav ing un touched the more com plex is sues.
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De fend ing this claim fully re quires much more than a short pa per, but I’d like to
out line a few points in its de fence. Per haps a good way to do this is to ex am ine the
pro cesses Gouws him self dis cusses as char ac teris ing the na ture of the pri mary pro -
cesses, and show how these fea tures point to a dif fer ent kind of men tal pro cess ing that
is rad i cally dif fer ent from that ex hib ited by the sec ond ary pro cesses. Gouws men tions
two ways in which pri mary pro cesses fail to be con strained by re al ity; the pri mary pro -
cesses fail to look at things “in a larger con text”, and they dis re gard “the con straints
placed on the cor rect use of lan guage.” Fail ure to look at things in a larger con text
means “match ing a de sire with its sat is fac tion, with out con sid er ing whether it is com -
pat i ble with a larger field of facts and de sires, over a lon ger pe riod. A max i mum frag -
men ta tion … gives the great est re lease from the con straints im posed by other de sires,
the facts and the time frame. Each de sire then seeks sat is fac tion sep a rately, with out
con sid er ing the con se quences for other de sires” (Gouws 2003: 368). Fram ing the dis -
cus sion in this way, it be comes ap par ent that, for Gouws, wishes are a spe cies of de -
sire, and wish ful think ing is al lied to or di nary think ing: when en gaged in wish ful
think ing, one fails to look at things in a larger con text, or one fails to con sider such
and such. The con cepts are cog ni tive. But this flies in the face of Freud's dis cov er ies;
it is not the case that the neu rotic or the hys teric sim ply over looks cer tain facts, or fails 
to con sider the con se quences of his or her de sires. For the most part, the neu rotic is
un able to in te grate many of the “facts” pre sented by re al ity into his cog ni tive frame -
work; the hys teric is not only un aware of many of her de sires, but would also be in ca -
pa ble of neatly dis tin guish ing one de sire from an other. Per haps an ex am ple would
make this clearer. In his In tro duc tory Lec tures, Freud dis cusses the case of a pa tient of 
his, who suf fered from ob ses sional neu ro sis. She per formed the fol low ing ac tiv ity sev -
eral times a day: “She ran from her room into an other neigh bour ing one, took up a par -
tic u lar po si tion there be side a ta ble that stood in the mid dle, rang the bell for her
house maid, sent her on some in dif fer ent er rand … and then ran back into her own
room.” The rea son for this com pul sive ac tiv ity could be traced to an in ci dent on her
wed ding night; her hus band, who was much older than she, was im po tent. Em bar -
rassed that this would be dis cov ered by the house maid in the morn ing, he poured red
ink on the bed sheet, “but not in the ex act place where a stain would have been ap pro -
pri ate … I could not un der stand at first what this rec ol lec tion had to do with the ob ses -
sional ac tion in ques tion … My pa tient then led me up to the ta ble in the sec ond room
and showed me a big stain on the ta ble cloth. She fur ther ex plained that she took up her 
po si tion in re la tion to the ta ble in such a way that the maid who had been sent for
could not fail to see the stain. There could no lon ger be any doubt of the in ti mate con -
nec tion be tween the scene on her wed ding-night and her pres ent ob ses sional ac tion,
though all kinds of other things re main to be learnt” (Freud 1981: 301). From this ex -
am ple, one sees that the symp tom is not an ac tion in the or di nary sense of the term, nor 
is it a straight for ward sat is fac tion of a de sire that can be clearly ar tic u lated. Symp toms
are very of ten com pro mises be tween mu tu ally in con sis tent de sires, and it is mis taken
to think that a neu rotic symp tom sat is fies a de sire in the way that, say, eat ing sat is fies
the de sire to avoid hun ger. This can be seen fur ther in the way that symp toms gen er -
ally fail to sat isfy the wishes that they “set out”4 to sat isfy: the wife's point ing out a
stain on the ta ble cloth was a very poor de fence of her hus band's rep u ta tion as a vir ile
lover – es pe cially since the stain that was made was an ink stain, and was not, in ac tual 
fact, proof of her lost vir gin ity. So it is very dif fi cult to think of a symp tom as sat is fy -
4 I use the in verted com mas to show that this “set ting out” to sat isfy a wish is not in ten tional.
ing a de sire in any or di nary sense – it is only when the con vo luted un con scious
thoughts are un tan gled that we be gin to make any sense of the mean ing of the
symptom. And even then, this meaning is understood very often only partially, by
means of a complex theory, and in no way amounts to the kind of ordinary “making
sense” that we employ in folk psychological explanations.
An other im por tant rea son for this lies in the very na ture of wish ful fil ment; as
Gouws rightly points out, sec ond ary pro cesses deal with the sat is fac tion of de sires in
re al ity. My de sire for choc o late im pels5 me to go to the lo cal store to buy an Aero;
should the store be closed, or should Aeros be sold out, I’ll try other av e nues (visit a
fel low choc o late-lov ing friend, or buy a Kit Kat in stead). The point about gen u ine de -
sires is that they are sen si tive to the ev i dence ex ter nal re al ity brings to them (“there is
no choc o late of the kind you want here”); we are also aware of whether our de sires are 
be ing ful filled – of fer me a carob bar in stead of a choc o late bar, and I’ll re fuse. I
might, of course, tem per or al ter my de sires over time – real is ing that I need to lose
weight, I might re strict my choc o late in take, or, if warned of the dan gers of eat ing too
much choc o late, I might in deed suc cumb ten ta tively to your of fer of a carob bar. De -
sires are struc tured so that the aim of the de sire is sep a rate from the ob ject that sat is -
fies it; the ac tion of the agent fills the gap, ei ther ac quir ing the ob ject so as to sat isfy
the de sire, or mak ing al ter na tive ar range ments if the de sire can not be ful filled. The
gap pro vides the soil in which the re al ity prin ci ple be gins to take root; the gap is in dic -
a tive of the ex is tence of a re al ity ex ter nal to the self and its bun dle of de sires. Wishes,
how ever, are quite dif fer ent; with out ther a peu tic in ter ven tion, they are nei ther in flu -
enced by re al ity, nor are they al tered eas ily over time. A wish does not dis tin guish be -
tween what it wants and the ob ject that will sat isfy these wants; aim and ob ject are col -
lapsed. To put it an other way, a wish does not dis tin guish be tween the con di tions of its 
sat is fac tion, and its ac tu ally be ing sat is fied.6 Let's take the para dig matic case of wish
ful fil ment: a baby's hal lu ci na tion of the breast. In imag in ing the breast, the in fant is
ful fill ing its wish to be sa ti ated. The hal lu ci na tion is si mul ta neously the ex pres sion of
the wish to be fed, and its ful fil ment: hal lu ci nat ing is all that the in fant need (can) do
in or der to sat isfy its wish to be sa ti ated. Of course, be cause wishes are not horses (or
breasts), the ac tiv ity of hal lu ci nat ing does not, ul ti mately, bring any real sat is fac tion,
and is even tu ally re lin quished in fa vour of ac tiv i ties more likely to end hun ger. That's
just the point about wishes – they are gov erned by pri mary pro cesses, and are in sen si -
tive to re al ity. And this is pre cisely why they dif fer from de sires. Re turn ing to the case 
of the im po tent hus band, we can see that the wife's wish to pre serve her hus band's rep -
u ta tion is more like an hal lu ci na tion than it is like a de sire: the ac tiv ity of point ing out
the stain on the ta ble cloth is an en act ment of her wish in the same way that the baby's
hal lu ci na tion of the breast is an en act ment of its de sire to be sat is fied. In ei ther case, it
would be in ap pro pri ate to use the dis course of in ten tional ac tion, of ac tiv i ties per -
formed for a rea son. Even though the wife doesn’t ac tu ally hal lu ci nate, her wish dis -
torts her per cep tion of re al ity – ta ble cloths with cof fee stains on them are per ceived as 
bed sheets with blood stains on them; or, to put it an other way, the ev i dence that re al -
ity might bring (“this is a ta ble cloth with a cof fee stain”) is ig nored in the light of the
wish. In the symp tom, in ter nal re al ity trumps ex ter nal re al ity. Of course, this oc curs in
de grees – the neu rotic has a greater hold on re al ity than the psy chotic, for whom in ner
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5 Or com pels, de pend ing on the level of my de sire and the state of my choc o late stash at home!
6 For fur ther dis cus sion on this point, see the works of Sebastian Gardner and James Hopkins.
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re al ity and pri mary pro cess ing all but re place ex ter nal re al ity and secondary pro cess -
ing.
This brings me to Gouws's sec ond point re gard ing the dif fer ences be tween pri mary
and sec ond ary pro cess ing – “Dis re gard ing the con straints placed on the cor rect use of
lan guage.” “In wish ful think ing,” he writes, “such con fu sions [er rors in lan guage] are
ac tively courted, the am bi gu ities of lan guage ex ploited to the hilt, and ver bal so lu tions 
to prob lems equated to ac tual so lu tions.” These fea tures of the un con scious, of wish ful 
think ing can be seen, Gouws writes, “as ex ten sions of ev ery day ‘in di rect’ or ‘fig u ra -
tive’ uses of lan guage … This is made eas ier by the very na ture of lan guage: the rules
im posed by lan guage are of ten un clear”(Gouws 2003: 369). Once again, Gouws hopes 
to show how the rules gov ern ing pri mary pro cess ing are not rad i cally dif fer ent from
those gov ern ing sec ond ary pro cess ing. But once again I would like to of fer an al ter na -
tive sug ges tion, which is that the un con scious does not func tion like a rule-gov erned
lan guage at all. In the un con scious, se man tic and syn tac tic rules break down. For in -
stance, there is, as Freud pointed out, no ne ga tion: in the un con scious there is no way
to rep re sent a neg a tive prop o si tion. Words and things have the same on to log i cal sta -
tus, as it were, which ac counts for the power wish ful think ing seems to have to it self:
words have the same causal ef fi cacy as do ob jects in the real world. This fan tasy about 
the power of lan guage un der lies many re li gious be liefs con cern ing magic, for in stance. 
It also ex plains the power of other kinds of “spe cial words”, like curses, charms, and,
po etry. It's not sim ply the case that the am bi gu ities of lan guage are “ex ploited to the
hilt”, for such ex ploi ta tion im plies that the rules of lan guage are known, but are bent to 
the will of the wish. But in the un con scious, the rules of lan guage cease to op er ate; se -
man tic and syn tac tic rules are re placed by as so ci a tion, an as so ci a tion in which the dis -
tance be tween the things as so ci ated col lapses to zero. It's not sim ply that A stands for
B – by stand ing for B, A be comes B.7 It is this fea ture of the un con scious that al lows
for con den sa tion and dis place ment: in con den sa tion, parts of an ob ject “stand in” for
the whole ob ject, and ob jects that are per ceived as be ing sim i lar in cer tain re spects
then are “col lapsed” into one. In dis place ment, com mon el e ments are trans ferred from
one ob ject onto an other. Other op er a tions of the un con scious dis play sim i lar char ac ter -
is tics, and il lus trate the fun da men tal dif fer ences be tween pri mary and sec ond ary pro -
cess ing.
Again, it is these dif fer ences that are elided in the dis cus sion of the na ture of wish
ful fil ment. This is not a triv ial is sue; the very pic ture of the mind is at stake. By plac -
ing wish ful fil ment and the re al ity prin ci ple at op po site ends of the same spec trum,
one is re main ing firmly fixed within the Car te sian par a digm – even though it's not the
case that ev ery thing men tal is con scious, ev ery thing men tal is cer tainly eas ily ca pa ble
of be com ing con scious, which is why I am doubt ful that the ar gu ments pre sented from 
this per spec tive strongly sup port the ex is tence of an un con scious. For one of the cen -
tral ten ets of psy cho anal y sis is that there are men tal items that are not eas ily ac ces si ble 
to con scious ness; in deed, there may very well be as pects of the mind that will never
be come con scious, even with de cades of anal y sis. And the rea son isn’t re sis tance
7 In The Un con scious as In fi nite Sets, Matte Blanco ex presses the char ac ter is tics of pri mary pro cess ing in 
terms of a “prin ci ple of sym me try”. He ar gues that dif fer ences be tween items in the un con scious are
erased by be ing col lapsed into re la tions of iden tity.
alone, if that is in ter preted in the sense of the con scious mind8 not wish ing to ac knowl -
edge cer tain un pleas ant, bur ied fan ta sies. The rea son, as I’ve been stress ing, is the
fundamental differences between conscious and unconscious mental processing.
In or der to high light these dif fer ences fur ther, I’ll turn to Gouws's anal y sis of three
fea tures of men tal life that ex hibit pri mary pro cess func tion ing. These are dreams,
speech in the an a lytic sit u a tion, and psy cho sis. Gouws states that “All three of these
phe nom ena which psy cho anal y sis takes to be para dig matic for the un con scious can
thus be seen as re sult ing from the eas ing of the con straints usu ally gov ern ing our deal -
ings with re al ity in the ra tio nal, re al is tic mode” (Gouws 2003: 367). Well – yes and
no. I am cer tainly in agree ment that these three cases are par a digm ex am ples of pri -
mary pro cess think ing, but, firstly, they are not all on a par, and sec ondly, pri mary
pro cess think ing does not re sult sim ply as a re sult of eas ing the con straints that gov ern 
our deal ings with re al ity. The sec ond point first: let's look at an other ex am ple of men -
tal life that holds sway when the “ra tio nal, re al is tic mode” loos ens its hold on us –
day dream ing. In my day dreams, I am a win ner at Wimble don, hold ing aloft the tro phy 
and shak ing the hand of the Duch ess of Wind sor. My day dream may be as elab o rate
and as de tailed as I wish, and may be as un re al is tic as I wish. In an other day dream, I
fly through the stars to Twin Earth, and have tea with my Twin Earth self, Queen Eliz -
a beth I and Sherlock Holmes. These day dreams are cer tainly pos si ble only when I wil -
fully ig nore the con straints of re al ity – as soon as I start to per form all the nec es sary
com pu ta tions in or der to as cer tain when would be the best time to leave for my trip,
and what I should pack, I’ll real ise the fu til ity of the en ter prise. Similarly (and sadly)
my dreams of win ning Wimble don are unrealistic, even though such day dreams seem
closer to this world than to some other pos si ble one. But day dreams, al though they can 
func tion only when re al ity is brack eted, do not ex hibit the fea tures of pri mary pro cess
think ing; when I day dream, I nor mally sus pend my be liefs about the real world, but
this is a dif fer ent sort of en ter prise from the avoid ance of re al ity that marks the fea -
tures of neu rotic symp toms and psy cho ses. When day dream ing, I am able to re cog nise 
re al ity when it shows its face – for one thing, the pro cess of day dream ing is given up
fairly eas ily – the shout from the teacher to pay at ten tion, the thought that I must buy
gro cer ies be fore the shops close, and so on. I thus want to ar gue that not all kinds of
wish ful think ing are equal to one an other – there are dif fer ent kinds of wish ful think -
ing, and some are more im per vi ous to the de mands of re al ity than oth ers. Wherein lies
the dif fer ence? The an swer is: in how far seeped in un con scious ma te rial the wish ful
thoughts are. Day dream ing lies pretty close to the sur face of our men tal life, whereas
neu rotic symp toms, dreams and psy cho sis, ly ing “fur ther down”, as it were, are more
“sat u rated”9 with pri mary pro cess func tion ing. When Gouws dis cusses dreams, speech 
in the an a lytic sit u a tion, and psy cho sis, he seems to treat them as if they are in stances
of the same men tal spe cies; say ing that they all fea ture el e ments of the fail ure of
“feed back mech a nisms” is an in ad e quate way of il lus trat ing the fun da men tal dif fer -
ences be tween, say, be ing in a psy chotic state and be ing in the an a lytic sit u a tion. In -
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8 This talk of the “con scious mind” “hid ing things” from the “un con scious mind” is prob lem atic, since it
tends to por tray the mind as di vided into homuncular parts.  This is a pic ture that I want very strongly to 
re sist – we should think of the terms “con scious” and “un con scious” as func tional, and not spa tial,  de -
scrip tions.  This ten dency to think of the mind as sit u ated is a rem nant of a Car te sian pic ture of the mind 
as a sep a rate kind of sub stance, even though Des cartes him self was at pains to point out that the mind is 
not spa tial.
9 Find ing the ap pro pri ate met a phor to talk about the un con scious is dif fi cult! The ten dency to talk about
the mind as spa tial is dif fi cult to re lin quish.
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deed, when talk ing about psy cho sis, he writes that “The re al is tic ful fil ment of de sires
is im peded, frus tra tion mounts, wish ful think ing holds sway, and the stage is set for a
vi cious cir cle” (Gouws 2003: 367). But this seems to be an in ad e quate ac count of what 
hap pens in psy cho sis; for one thing, it's not clear that the psy chotic ex pe ri ences frus -
tra tion – I sup pose it de pends on the na ture and the ex tent of the psy cho sis. In some
psy chotic ep i sodes, if the per son is suf fi ciently far re moved from re al ity, the mind may 
be so in the grip of the pri mary pro cess that there is no room for frus tra tion. And again 
– the kind of “wish ful think ing” that holds sway for the psy chotic is of a dif fer ent de -
gree en tirely from the kind of wish ful think ing I en gage in when I dream about win -
ning Wimble don or trav el ling to Twin Earth. In psy cho sis, it's hard to know whether
many psy chotic acts can be la belled “think ing” at all, where “thoughts” in this case are 
un der stood as cog ni tive10 – i.e. gov erned by sec ond ary pro cesses. We cer tainly would
not wish to place the ex pe ri ence of the psy chotic and that of the or di nary analysand in
the same cat e gory – and yet the claim that sec ond ary and pri mary pro cess think ing are
not that dis sim i lar threat ens to do just that. With re gard to the neu rotic, Freud wrote
fa mously that the aim of anal y sis is to give the per son more con trol over her life, so
that the forces of the un con scious no lon ger dom i nate – “Where Id is, there Ego shall
be.” This, of course, pre sup poses that in the neu rotic, there is a dif fer ence be tween Id
and Ego, be tween pri mary and sec ond ary pro cess think ing, and the lat ter is, by and
large, the dom i nant form of dis course. In psy cho sis, there is no hope of ex tend ing the
do main of the Ego – in the grip of the psy cho sis, the Ego re sem bles the shell of a
burned-out shel ter rather than any kind of habitable abode.
By now, the cen tral point of my pa per should be clear: that it is a mis take to draw
the dis tinc tion be tween pri mary and sec ond ary pro cesses as a mere dif fer ence in de -
gree be tween items that be long to the same men tal type. This kind of anal y sis of the
mind fails to take se ri ously the rad i cal pic ture that psy cho anal y sis pres ents to us. I am
cer tainly in fa vour of ac com mo dat ing psy cho anal y sis in con tem po rary cog ni tive ac -
counts of the men tal, but we must be wary not to con fuse the kinds of “un con scious”
pro cesses that cog ni tive psy chol o gists talk about with the dy namic un con scious that is
Freud's leg acy to us. For Freud, the un con scious was not sim ply that which is un -
known, but that which is un know able. Mak ing the un con scious con scious re quires
chang ing the struc tures that gov ern men tal life – no triv ial ex er cise. If we re ally wish
to place psy cho anal y sis out side the Car te sian land scape, we need to take full ac count
of the na ture of those men tal states – wishes and phantasies – that can not be fully ar -
tic u lated in the lan guage of cog ni tive psy chol ogy. The un con scious, con trary to
Lacan's dic tum, is not struc tured like a lan guage, at least not if we un der stand “lan -
guage” as the sub ject mat ter of lin guis tics. Cer tainly the un con scious has a method of
its own; cer tainly there are prin ci ples that gov ern the pri mary pro cesses – these meth -
ods and prin ci ples form the sub ject mat ter of psy cho anal y sis. That is why clar i fy ing
the do main of the un con scious – de mar cat ing its bor ders, giv ing con di tions of cit i zen -
ship – is im por tant. Like the past, the un con scious is an other coun try, and, like the
past, it is not a hab it able region; although it's true that humans cannot bear too much
reality, we cannot bear too much phantasy either.
10 And one of the cen tral con tri bu tions of psy cho anal y sis has been to show us that “thoughts” are not only
cog ni tive.
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